In the previous segment, we explored early efforts by full-service broadcasters to secure “super-power” authorizations, particularly focusing on WLW’s 500,000-watt Special Temporary Authority at 700 kc/s. These requests for super-power were fueled by the FCC’s position in anticipation of the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) of 1941, aimed at standardizing radio broadcasting across the Western Hemisphere. The planning for NARBA began in the mid-1930s, and its goals were further influenced by the presence of powerful “border blasters” operating from Mexico, which disrupted U.S. broadcast signals. The U.S. delegation sought the ability to counter these border blasters with its own super-power stations, while also balancing the interests of established clear-channel broadcasters against Congress, and those who viewed super-power as a means of consolidating media control.
NARBA Changes
During the NARBA conference, the U.S. delegation proposed protecting 25 frequencies for exclusive use by single stations, which could include super-power stations, and another 21 frequencies for stations operating at 50 kW. For the first time, two classifications were introduced: 1-A and 1-B stations. 1-A stations would operate non-directionally with sole nighttime use of their frequencies, while 1-B channels could accommodate multiple stations, each transmitting at a maximum of 50 kW, often using directional antennas to minimize interference. These 1-B stations would accept interference from other countries, even within U.S. borders, but the 1-A stations would have greater protection from interference.
Intriguing Language
Some countries at the NARBA conference pushed for a clause that would shape future discussions on clear-channel stations. The language established that while 1-B stations could transmit up to 50 kW, 1-A stations would be granted a minimum of 50 kW. This subtle wording marked a significant departure from the FCC’s typical 50 kW maximum limit, and would play a key role in future U.S. policy. In return for this concession, the U.S. secured an important geographical stipulation: co-channel stations in neighboring countries would be required to be at least 650 miles away from the U.S. border, effectively preventing most co-channel operations on U.S. 1-A frequencies throughout North America. The U.S. delegation returned home with protection for its 25 1-A channels, as well as an agreement to expand the AM band up to 1600 kc/s.
The Great Dial Switch
To implement the changes from NARBA, the U.S. undertook a major frequency reassignment on March 29, 1941. Many AM stations shifted to new positions on the dial, generally moving up 10 to 30 kc/s, although most stations only retuned their equipment without significant changes to their infrastructure. As a result, some stations still operate with towers that are not optimally sized for their current frequency.
With NARBA’s implementation complete, the FCC turned its attention to ensuring reliable nighttime service to the country’s “white areas.” Discussions on how to best serve these areas had begun as early as 1936, but it wasn’t until February 20, 1945, that the FCC officially opened Docket 6741, marking the beginning of the clear-channel broadcast debate. This issue would last for over three decades, involving significant legal and engineering discussions.
Engineering and Economic Advice
As part of the clear-channel proceedings, the FCC sought input from the broadcasting industry on how to address the coverage needs of white areas. Advisory engineering committees suggested the creation of at least four national nighttime services. However, it was agreed that four stations could not effectively cover the entire country, and duplication would be necessary. Economic considerations also played a crucial role in the discussions. Some industry experts argued that the economic model for U.S. broadcasting might not support super-power stations, especially in sparsely populated areas, where advertising revenue could not sustain such operations. This led to comparisons with Rural Free Delivery, where urban centers subsidize services to remote areas.
The committees concluded that super-power stations would need to be located in urban centers to secure financial backing, but relocating these stations to less populated areas would likely be economically unfeasible. This economic argument, coupled with other factors, led the FCC to focus on duplicating clear-channel frequencies rather than expanding super-power stations.
What’s Next?
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the clear-channel issue continued to surface, with a range of interests vying for influence. Some stakeholders saw a genuine need to provide better service to white areas, while others pushed for the dissolution of 1-A stations altogether. As the FCC considered these competing interests, it gradually shifted toward a more politically acceptable position, advocating for “more stations” as a solution to the problem.
In 1946, the FCC allowed “Daytimer” stations to operate on 1-A channels, but only within a 750-mile radius of existing 1-A stations, to avoid interfering with high-power operations. This decision led to the rise of political advocacy, as new Daytimer stations sought their place on the dial.
In 1948, CBS proposed incorporating FM stations into the definition of white-area service, arguing that new FM assignments would extend coverage to numerous new communities. However, the FCC rejected this argument, maintaining that clear-channel stations would remain essential for wide-area coverage, a stance it held until the 1970s.
By 1958, the FCC began tentatively proposing new frequency allocations for the western states, including the creation of additional Class I and II stations to address coverage gaps. These proposals were part of a broader effort to improve service to underserved areas, although they also underscored the complexity of balancing competing interests in the evolving world of U.S. radio broadcasting.